Keywords: Ontologies, Description logics, Nonmonotonic logics, Law, Cybercrime, Counterfactuals, Concept fitting.

Abstract: We present in this paper a small formal cybercrime ontology by using concrete tools. The purpose is to show how law articles and legal cases could be defined so that the problem of case resolution is reduced to a classification problem as long as cases are seen as subclasses of articles. Secondly, we show how counterfactual reasoning may be held over it. Lastly, we investigate the implementation of an hybrid system which is based both on this ontology and on a non-monotonic rule based system which is used to execute, in a rule based way, an external ontology dealing with a technical domain in order to clarify some of the technical concepts.

1 INTRODUCTION

We investigate in this paper the implementation of a formal ontology for criminal law dealing with cybercrime which is both functional and applicative. Our objective is twofold. First, we wish to present the ontology and an example of counterfactual reasoning it may support in a less abstract way than usual by using concrete tools. We use Protégé (Protégé, 2007) which is an ontology editor supporting the OWL language and Racer (Racer, 2007) which is a reasoning system based on description logic. We wish also to depict in the case of an interdisciplinary collaboration the clarification of some technical concepts through the use of a nonmonotonic inference engine. This clarification allows the enrichment of the ontology in a way that may have consequences in the judge decision. Having worked on law texts related to computer security, we have chosen cybercrime as a subfield of criminal law as long as it constitutes a relatively small closed field. This paper is structured as follows. In the following section remind some of the basic ideas related to formal ontologies, typically Protégé ontologies, and to description logics. In section 3, the corpus of interest is described and structured into classes. Section 4 is devoted to the reasoning mechanism that allows us solving a case by identifying the law articles covering it. Issues related to concept fitting are pointed out in section 5 and a technique to achieve such an operation is presented in section 6.

2 PRELIMINARIES

The use of ontologies in legal domains is an issue which has been intensively investigated (Asaro et al., 2003; Bench-Capon & Visser, 1997; Breuker et al., 2002; Valente, 1995). A formal ontology describes the concepts and the relations relating them in a given domain. The relations define the semantics. Building a formal ontology is especially recommended for domains expressed in natural language as documents and corpus. An immediate benefit from the definition of such a formal ontology is the normalization of the semantics materialized by a structured terminology. This normalization is most relevant in the case of an interdisciplinary collaboration where a given term may carry real ambiguity according to one field or another. Indeed, natural language is characterized by its contextual nature which may lead to different interpretations. Think, in a forensic context, of how computer data
suppression might be understood by a judge with no special knowledge in computer science. Expressing the concepts in a formal language such as OWL helps stabilizing the interpretation of these terms. Besides, expressing a formal ontology in OWL makes it machine consumable.

In computer science, mainly three kinds of ontologies are to be distinguished (Sowa, 2007). Terminological ontologies in which concepts are named and are structured using mainly relations of the sub-type/super-type kind. As a matter of fact, such an ontology which is sometimes referred to as taxonomy can be expressed by using rules as we will further do it in the case of the ontology of computer data suppression. Ontologies of the second kind are those of which the concepts are built by enumerating the instances which compose them on the basis of some metric which defines their similarity. These concepts come usually as a result of a classification and are not named beforehand. The third type of ontology is the most sophisticated. The concepts are defined by axioms generally expressed in a decidable fragment of first order logic, namely Description Logic. Logical inferences can then be implemented for the classification of new instances. Incontestably, Description Logic is currently without the standard for expressing formal ontologies on the basis of the OWL language for example. Efforts are carried out to extend it to a system able to handle knowledge expressed in the form of rules. This way, requests could be sent to existing rule bases within the semantic Web (Eiter et al., 2004). Another advantage that we outline in this extension is the possibility of supplementing a knowledge representation based on Description Logic by a rule based representation when this is more adequate. The use of rules is all the more relevant when it comes to take into account certain exceptions which characterize nonmonotonic reasoning.

2.2 Description Logics

A knowledge base using description logic as a knowledge representation tool has two components:
- the TBox which contains the terminology of the domain of interest.
- the ABox which contains assertions on individuals named through the defined terminology.

The vocabulary is composed by concepts which denote individual sets and roles which denote binary relations between individuals. The description language which is specific to each description logic system has a well defined semantic: each TBox or ABox declaration may be identified to a formula of first order logic or a slight extension of it.

Description logic provides also reasoning tools to decide for example if a description is consistent or not or if it is more general than another. Elementary descriptions are atomic concepts and atomic roles. These allow more complex descriptions to be built with concept constructors.

The description logic language we shall use is defined by the following assertions where C and D are concepts, A an atomic concept and R a role.

\[
\begin{align*}
A & \quad \text{atomic concept} \\
T & \quad \bot \quad \text{(universal concept and empty concept)} \\
¬C & \quad \text{(concept negation)} \\
C \land D & \quad \text{(concept intersection)} \\
C \lor D & \quad \text{(concept union)} \\
\forall R.C & \quad \text{(value restriction)} \\
\exists R.C & \quad \text{(limited existential quantification)}
\end{align*}
\]

A formal ontology is defined by a set of structured concepts and a number of inclusions between these concepts.

The semantics of the concepts and roles is defined with respect to a domain of interpretation O which defines the interpretation of each constant A: t(A) = a.
Concepts are interpreted as subsets of \( O \) and roles are interpreted as binary relations over \( O \) satisfying:

\[
\begin{align*}
\iota(T) &= O, \quad \iota(\bot) = \emptyset \\
\iota(\neg C) &= \iota(C) \setminus \iota(C) \\
\iota(C \cap D) &= \iota(C) \cap \iota(D) \\
\iota(C \cup D) &= \iota(C) \cup \iota(D) \\
\iota(\forall R.C) &= \{d \in O | (d,e) \in \iota(R) \Rightarrow e \in \iota(C) \text{ for all } e \in O \} \\
\iota(\exists R.C) &= \{d \in O | \text{there exists } e \in O \text{ s.t. } (d,e) \in \iota(R) \text{ and } e \in \iota(C) \}
\end{align*}
\]

Two frameworks are mainly referred to in practical logics: logic programming and first order logic. An important difference between these two frameworks is the close world assumption (CWA) admitted in the former and the open world assumption (OWA) admitted in the latter.

Even if OWL admits primarily the OWA, CWA may be admitted if stated explicitly. CWA is very useful for dealing with the application of forward chaining. If in a rule base, only the rule “IF offence OR crime THEN infringement” infers the fact infringement, CWA allows inferring that there is no infringement if none of the facts offence or crime is established.

### 3 THE CORPUS

We list in this subsection the French criminal law articles that are of interest to us and from which irrelevant metadata has been removed (Légifrance, 2007).

#### Article 323-1

*Fraudulently accessing or remaining within all or part of an automated data processing system is punished by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.*

Where this behaviour causes the suppression or modification of data contained in that system, or any alteration of the functioning of that system, the sentence is two years’ imprisonment and a fine of €30,000.

#### Article 323-2

*The fraudulent introduction of data into an automated data processing system is punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000.*

#### Article 323-3

*The fraudulent introduction of data into an automated data processing system or the fraudulent suppression or modification of the data that it contains is punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000.*

#### Article 323-4

*The participation in a group or conspiracy established with a view to the preparation of one or more offences set out under articles 323-1 to 323-3, and demonstrated by one or more material actions, is punished by the penalties prescribed for offence in preparation or the one that carries the heaviest penalty.*

We shall consider in what follows three concepts: Malicious actions which are punished by criminal law, responsibilities related to an action and the criminal law articles. Other classes of our ontology such as Sanction and Infringement are of less interest in what we shall expose.

Several actions may be qualified as being malicious in computer security and put in classes like privacy or hacking which in its turn covers classes like intrusion, denial of service….etc.

The class Malicious_Act depicts a classification for a sample of malicious actions:

![Diagram of Malicious_Act](Figure 1: The class of malicious actions.)

Criminal law makes a distinction between two types of responsibilities, objective responsibility which may be commission, omission or attempt and the
subjective responsibility which describes the intentional nature of the act. Of course the classes and subclasses defining these concepts are exclusives.

Figure 2: The class of responsibilities.

Criminal law articles which are of interest to us are grouped in the class Articles. As a matter of fact there are only six articles that deal directly with cybercrime. Among these, for our purpose, we shall consider in particular four articles.

It should be outlined that the conception that we make of a law article makes of it a class which groups all the cases it allows to characterize, that is to say the cases which fall under this article. In this respect our model (see appendix) is different from (Asaro et al., 2003). The rationale behind this conceptualization is that the concept of case inherits of the same characteristics and properties as in the concept of article. Henceforth, the application of our ontology consists in classifying, if possible, each case of interest as a subclass of one or more subclasses of Articles.

Figure 3: The class of articles.

Listed below are some of the relations of interest we shall use here. In particular, between the two classes Articles and Responsibility the relation hasResponsibility specifies the nature of the responsibility handled in the article which may be commission, omission or attempt in the case of objective responsibility or which may be intentional or unintentional in the case of subjective responsibility. For each relation its inverse relation is given. Inverse relations are very useful and enhance the way of expressing axioms as we shall see below.

Figure 4: Properties with their inverses.

4 USING A REASONER

The possibility of using a reasoner to build automatically the hierarchy of classes is one of the major advantages in using OWL-DL. Indeed in the case of important ontologies containing hundreds of classes the use of a reasoner is crucial, in particular when dealing with multiple inheritance. Thus the designer will focus on logical description which is hierarchical, flexible and consequently easy to maintain.

4.1 Articles conceptualization

Ontologies which are described in OWL-DL may be processed by a reasoner. One of the main tasks handled by a reasoner is to check if a given class is a subclass of another class. Another task is to check consistency, the reasoner can check on the basis of the class conditions if the class may have instances or not. A class which has no instances is inconsistent. Thus a class which is defined to be a subclass of both classes A and B which are disjoint will be detected as inconsistent by the reasoner.

Necessary conditions are used to express « if an object is in this class it necessarily must satisfy these conditions ». A class which uses only necessary conditions is called partial.

Necessary and sufficient conditions are used to express « if an object is in this class it necessarily must satisfy these conditions and if an individual satisfy these conditions then it necessary belongs to this class». Such a class is said to be complete and
allow a CAW reasoning. All the classes we shall deal with in this paper are complete.

The classes art_323-1, art_323-2, art_323-3 et art_323-4 are complete:

- art_323-1
- art_323-2
- art_323-3
- art_323-4

Several acts may be qualified as being malicious in computer security and put in classes like privacy or hacking which in its turn covers classes like intrusion, denial of service....etc.

The class Malicious_Act depicts a classification for a sample of malicious actions:

Criminal law makes a distinction between two types of responsibilities, objective responsibility which may be commission, omission or attempt and the subjective responsibility which describes the intentional nature of the act.

4.2 Reasoning with counterfactuals

We are going to depict the expressive power of description logic through an example where it is made an assumption that contradicts the reality. This kind of reasoning is called counterfactual reasoning (Ginsberg, 1986). It allows reasoning on abstract facts which are inconsistent with actual facts. For example, solving a case which falls under article Art_323-4 needs, as stated by this even article, to compare the case to articles Art_323-1, Art_323-2 and Art_323-3. Solving the case is made possible by making an assumption in the definition of Art_323-4 which is contrary to what is stated in it. Indeed, think of a case defined by Attempt and Intrusion. To realise that this case falls under article 323-4, one should first assume that in case the responsibility was Commission then the case would have fallen under Article 323-1. This is a counterfactual reasoning as long as the assumption Commission is contrary to the Attempt responsibility which characterizes the case at hand. The fact that in propositional logics the formula A→B is equivalent to ¬A∨B makes it possible to express this assumption within Description logics.

∃foresee. ∃isForseen.(¬(hasResponsibility.Commission)∪(Art_323-1∪Art_323-2∪Art_323-3))

According to the interpretation rules given above, this is to be understood as the class of articles that foresee malicious actions that are foreseen in articles Art_323-1, Art_323-2 or Art_323-3, by assuming Commission responsibility. Rewritten as:

∃∃∃i.¬(C∩A1∪A2∪A3))

A1, A2 and A3 are the axioms defining the three first articles C stands for articles stating Commission responsibility. To isolate within the articles the stated malicious actions from the responsibility, axioms A1, A2, A3 are rewritten as:

A1=C∩A1_3
A2=C∩A2_3
A3=C∩A3_3

By substitution, we have:

∃∃∃i.¬(C∩(A1∪A2∪A3))

Thus :

∃∃∃i.¬(C∩(A1∪A2∪A3))

It is easy to prove in propositional logic :

¬Cu(C∩X)→Cu(¬C∩X)∪(¬C∩X) = ¬Cu((¬Cu C)∩X) = ¬Cu X

Therefore, we have:

∃∃∃i.¬(CuA1∪A2∪A3)

The point here is that we have succeeded this way to evacuate from Art_323-1, Art_323-2 and Art_323-3 the Commission responsibility to make things consistent. Figure 6 shows the resolution of three
cases. Case_1 consists in both system blocking and
data modification which have been committed,
thanks to multiple inheritance, and case_2 is a case
where an intrusion attempt has been stated. Case_3
is an example of cases that might not be resolved,
for example a case referring to data theft which does
not appear explicitly in the corpus.

Figure 6: Inferred Ontology.

5 Fitting technical concepts and
legal concepts

Mismatching between legal concepts and technical
concepts constitutes a serious issue (De Lamberterie
and videau, 2006). For example, Computer data
suppression happens to be mentioned in some of
criminal law articles. With no explicit legal
definition, this naturally leads the judge to adopt the
natural language definition for suppression. The
common understanding of the term suppression is
physical suppression where a thing which is
suppressed merely stops existing. However, in the
computer world, suppressing data means very often
logical suppression where data could be restored
with adequate tools. In addition to that, even in the
case of a physical suppression, computer data could
be restored when a backup or archiving politic is
observed by the data processor.

This semantic difference should be definitively
specified because of the penal consequences for a
fraudulent computer data suppression may vary
according to the possibility of recovering the data.
This means that although the act is condemnable in
both cases, the sanction might be worsened or
attenuated depending on the type of suppression.

To make the common understanding of the term
suppression fit the effective definition of the term
computer data suppression, one solution consists in
« connecting » its concept in a legal ontology to its
concept in a computer ontology. This connection
may need some new concepts and new relations with
the two already existing ontologies. New concepts
may also be needed to summarize or to extract from
the second ontology that information which is
readily of interest for a legal reasoning. For
example, in the case we are dealing with, such new
concepts are « restorable data» and «unrestorable
data». These ontological adjustments may prove to
be disproportionate in case where the relevant
information is well defined. It is indeed sufficient to
compute this information by using a rule based
inference engine. As a matter of fact, the second
ontology is principally used to deduce facts rather
than for classification.

6 HYBRID REASONING

In a case where only the subsumption relation is
used to deduce relevant facts, it is sufficient to use
the second ontology in a rule based form within a
propositional logic framework. However the
inference engine to be used should allow non
monotonic reasoning if we wish preserve the
ontology structure in this translation and in the same
time manage conflicting facts. We have chosen to
use an inference engine based on stratified forward
chaining which through an adequate backward
chaining (Bezzazi, 2006) sends questions to the user
to compute which of the facts « existing data » or «
non-existing data » holds for the suppressed data. It
should be noticed that the concept of legal
suppression as well as the concept of computer data
suppression, both inherits somehow of the French
language concept of the term suppression which
normally entails the no more existence of the
suppressed object. Indeed, according to the French
definition, to suppress something is to be understood
as putting an end to the existence of something.

French_suppression > !existence
Legal_suppression > French_suppression
data_suppression > French_suppression.
The translation of this ontology fragment as a rule base yields:

Logical_suppression > data_suppression
Physical_suppression > data_suppression
Formatting > Logical_suppression
Destruction > Physical_suppression
Demagnetization > Physical_suppression
Rewriting > Physical_suppression
Partial_rewriting > Rewriting
Total_rewriting > Rewriting

We add a rule which expresses that data which has been logically suppressed may still exist.

Logical_suppression > existence

If logical suppression is established, the stratified forward chaining will, like an inheritance system with exceptions, give priority to the application of this last rule with respect to the more general rule:

French_suppression > !existence

Therefore, this rule base should help the lawyer or the judge make their decisions or instruct a case by shedding light on a technical concept lacking a legal definition. The explanation process is done through a question-response procedure.

7 CONCLUSIONS

The framework we have presented in this paper is based on the idea of considering cases as being, by their structure, subclasses of articles. Therefore, the problem of solving a case is the same as that of classifying it. With such a system at work, all one has to do is implement articles as classes which should not be a difficult task at least manually. Doing this in a semi automatic or automatic way constitutes an interesting topic for investigation. We have also shown, in a rather practical way, how counterfactual reasoning and non monotonic reasoning are naturally used in legal reasoning. However further work need to be done on this topic independently of any domain of interest to analyze the mechanisms that implement counterfactual reasoning and to what extent this may be done. We have also introduced some conceptual and technical ideas related to fitting technical concepts and legal concepts. Computer data suppression is one example among other technical concepts which need clarification such as integrity and anonymity. We think that such concepts must be identified in the law texts for their natural ontology be connected to a well built legal ontology through easily understood production rules.

REFERENCES